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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

KENNETH B. ELLIS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970294-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Theft
from a Person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1997), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Stephen Henriod and the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judges,
presiding.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)

(1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue:

Did the trial court err in denying Ellis' Motion

to Continue where material evidence was discovered the morning of
the last day of trial?
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to grant or
deny a continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

See

State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991), cert,
denied, 843 P.2d 516 (1992).
STATUTES
The statutes determinative of the issues on appeal are as
follows:

Theft - Elements, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) :
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another with a
purpose to deprive him thereof.
Theft From A Person, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp.
1997):
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this
chapter shall be punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the . . .(iv)
property is stolen from the person of another;
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Appellant's Motion to Continue based on newly discovered
evidence is preserved on the record for appeal ("R.") at 137.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant Kenneth Ellis ("Ellis") was charged by
information with one count of theft from a person in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412.

R.4. Ellis entered a not guilty plea

and was tried before a jury along with his codefendant, Tommy
Carter ("Carter").

R.13-14.

On the morning of the last day of

trial, after both parties rested but before the jury went into
deliberation, Ellis moved for a continuance based on newly
discovered information.

R.40,137.

motion and the case proceeded.
Carter guilty as charged.

Id.

R.3 6,69.

The trial court denied the
The jury found Ellis and
Ellis appeals from that

conviction.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Ellis and Carter were charged with theft of money from
the person of the complainant Joshua Irvin ("Irvin") in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412.

R.4. The facts giving rise to
2

this case are in dispute.
Ellis and Carter were longtime friends who had not seen
each other for some time when they coincidentally met at the same
bus stop in front of the Main Street entrance to Crossroads Plaza
in downtown Salt Lake while waiting for their respective busses.
R.135 [139,149,206-08] .

The two men were talking and had decided

to go get a beer when Carter spied Irvin walking by.
41,208-09] .

Carter sensed that Irvin was in the market for drugs

and so approached Irvin.
to talk.

R.135 [140-

R.135 [141].

R.135[141,156].

Carter and Irvin began

Carter indicated that he could take Irvin

to someone who could supply marijuana.

Id.

Irvin agreed and

gave Carter approximately thirteen dollars.
privy to the deal and did not know Irvin.

Id. Ellis was not

R.135[149,210,213].

Ellis nonetheless followed behind Carter and Irvin as they walked
through the mall and then along the street in a northwest
direction toward the supplier's house.

R.135[143,149,209].

Ellis also saw Irvin give an indeterminate amount of cash money
to Carter.

R.135[210].

After a few blocks, Irvin started to complain of the
distance.

R.135[144].

Carter did not tell Irvin the exact

distance, but later explained at trial that the supplier was
about fifteen blocks from Crossroads Plaza.
8 0] .

R. 135 [144,176,179-

Irvin became agitated and said, "I know what you guys are

going to do.

I'm going to get you niggers!"

Irvin ran off, leaving his money with Carter.

R.13 5[144-45].
Id.

Carter and Ellis went to a nearby convenience store and
3

bought beer using some of Irvin's money.

R.135[145,214].

Ellis

and Carter then proceeded to the Greyhound bus station where they
sat on a wall and drank the beer.

R.135[145,214].

At trial, Irvin denied the drug deal, noting that it was
not his "usual practice" to buy drugs from strangers.
134 [15,25] .

He also denied that he used marijuana.

R.

R.134 [25] .

Instead, Irvin stated that he was around 50 North, 200 West in
downtown Salt Lake City awaiting a bus to his home in West
Valley.

R.134[l].

Although he normally waited at a bus stop in

front of Crossroads Plaza on Main Street, this day he was thirsty
and so chose a stop on North Temple near a convenience store
where he could buy a drink.

R.134[18].

Irvin testified that he was walking toward the
convenience store when Ellis and Carter approached from behind.
R.134 [5-6,44] .

Ellis distracted Irvin while Carter picked his

front pants pocket and took approximately thirteen dollars cash.
Id.

Ellis and Carter then "trotted" off.

R.134[9].

Irvin

stated that he initially decided not to report the theft but
then, feeling "victimized," called 911 from a nearby motel lobby.
R.134 [10-11] .
According to Officers Melody Gray ("Gray") and Todd
Mitchell ("Mitchell"), Mitchell received a dispatch from the 911
operator regarding a "strong arm" robbery on North Temple.
134 [53] .

R.

The operator indicated to Mitchell that Irvin was

waiting for them at the motel and that he alleged that Ellis and
Carter robbed money from him.

R.134[65-66].
4

Gray was yet

unaware that money was stolen.

R.134[61-62].

Mitchell and Gray met Irvin at the motel.

R.134[55].

Irvin pointed in the direction that Ellis and Carter fled.
R.134 [55,61] . Mitchell and Gray proceeded by bike in that
direction and Irvin followed on foot.

R.134[[15,66].

Within a

few blocks, the officers came upon Ellis and Carter sitting on a
wall in front of the Greyhound bus station.
identified them as his assailants.

R.134[66-67].

Irvin

R.134[15].

Ellis and Carter did not attempt to flee, but appeared
surprised as the officers approached and detained them.
R.134 [63] . Mitchell spoke with Carter while Gray spoke with
Ellis.

R.134[56,67].

Ellis asked Gray what was going on.

R.

134 [57] . Without mentioning the allegedly stolen cash, Gray
explained that they were theft suspects.

Id.

Ellis voluntarily

and repeatedly stated that he did not take the money.

Id.

Gray

then turned the investigation over to Mitchell, who mirandized
Ellis and Carter individually.

R. 134 [59] .

Mitchell began questioning Ellis and Carter.

R. 134 [68] .

Ellis explained that he saw Irvin give the money to Carter, that
he did not know Irvin, and that he never touched Irvin7s person.
R.134 [68], R.135[84] .

Ellis never referred to Irvin by name as

he spoke with Mitchell.

R.134[68].

Mitchell searched Carter's

pants pockets and found a ten-dollar bill and some change.

R.

135 [86-87] .

Irvin witnessed this and asked if he would get his

money back.

Id.

Mitchell asked Irvin to leave.

R.134[67].

Carter then voluntarily stated that the events did not occur as
5

Irvin described them.

R.134[70].

Carter and took them to jail.

Mitchell arrested Ellis and

R.134[72].

Ellis was detained in jail during trial.

On the morning

of the last day of trial, Ellis discovered that a fellow inmate
was an acquaintance of Irvin.

R.137[2].

The inmate, Brian Meek

("Meek"), indicated that he saw Irvin use methamphetamine in the
past.

R.137[2].

Ellis notified his attorney and the trial court

that same morning before trial was to resume.

Id.

Upon the

trial court's instruction, Ellis' attorney spoke with Meek at the
jail.

Id.

Meek elaborated that he knew Irvin from high school,

that he had seen him use methamphetamine within the past two
years, and that he was aware that Irvin owed money to another
friend for prior drug deals.

R.13 7[3].

Based on this newly discovered information, Ellis moved
for a continuance.

R.137[2].

At that point in trial, both

parties had rested but the jury was not yet in deliberation.
Ellis explained to the court that he needed time to explore
Meck's assertions.

R.137[3-4].

Ellis noted that Meck's

statements were material to his defense in that they contradicted
Irvin's claims that he did not engage in drug deals with
strangers and that he did not use drugs.

R.137[2].

The trial

court denied Ellis' motion without explanation on the record.
137 [4] .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Ellis' motion for a
continuance.

The newly discovered statements of Meek were
6

R.

admissible and material to Ellis' defense.

Moreover, Meek could

have been produced to testify within a reasonable time and
without undue delay of the proceedings.

Ellis also exercised due

diligence in preparation for his trial and could not have
otherwise discovered Meck's statements absent Meck's own
disclosures.

Ellis respectfully requests this Court to reverse

and remand for a new trial since, in addition to the foregoing,
Ellis was materially prejudiced by the trial court's denial of
the continuance or, alternatively, since the outcome of his trial
would have been different had the continuance been granted.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ELLIS' MOTION TO
CONTINUE UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.

The trial court erred in denying Ellis' motion to continue
where Meck's newly discovered statements were admissible and
material to Ellis' defense.

Meek would testify that Irvin used

methamphetamine in the past and that he owes money to another for
prior drug deals.

R.137[2-4].

Ellis asserts as his defense that

Irvin was not robbed, but rather that Irvin and Carter entered
into a drug deal in which Irvin gave the allegedly stolen money
to Carter and then surrendered it when he left in a fit of anger.
R.135 [138-234] .

To this end, Meck's statements would provide

material evidence in support of Ellis' defense theory, as well as
impeach Irvin's claims that he does not use marijuana and that he
did not strike a deal with Carter since it is not his "usual
practice" to deal with strangers.
A trial court errs in denying a request for a continuance
7

when the moving party adequately establishes that "denial of the
motion will prevent the party from obtaining material and
admissible evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks can
be produced within a reasonable time, and that it has exercised
due diligence in preparing the case before requesting the
continuance."

Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476.

Ellis made the requisite

showing under Oliver and is therefore entitled to a continuance.
A.

Ellis Established That Denial Of The Continuance Would
Prevent Him From Obtaining Material And Admissible
Evidence.

Pursuant to Oliver and as the moving party, Ellis adequately
established that denial of a continuance would prevent him from
obtaining material and admissible evidence.

820 P.2d at 4 76.

Irvin alleges that Ellis and Carter acted in concert to rob him
of approximately thirteen dollars.

R.134[5-10].

As his defense,

Ellis asserts that Irvin and Carter entered into a drug deal to
which Ellis was not a party, Irvin gave Carter thirteen dollars
for marijuana and then surrendered the money when he left in a
fit of anger.

R.135[138-234].

Upon cross-examination, Irvin

denied the drug deal and that he uses marijuana.

R.134[25].

Meck's statements provide substantive evidence in support of
Ellis' defense theory, as well as impeach Irvin's denial of a
drug deal and marijuana use.

Specifically, Meek indicated that

he saw Irvin use methamphetamine two years prior to Ellis' trial.
R.137[3].

Meek also indicated that Irvin owed money to a friend

for past drug deals.

Id.

As explained to the trial court by

Ellis' attorney,
8

[T]his is new information that may be important to the case;
. . . Mr. Irvin indicated that he doesn't use drugs in his
testimony. He also indicated that . . . his usual practice
is not to buy drugs from strangers . . . [I]f we were to
find the person who he owes money to for drugs, . . . that
would impeach [Irvin's] statement. . . . [We are] asking the
Court to give us some time to investigate this better.
R.137[3] .
Meck's statements are "material" for purposes of Oliver
because they provide independent evidence in support of Ellis'
defense theory that Irvin was a party to the drug deal with
Carter.

First, Meck's statements would establish that Irvin has

used drugs in the past and, therefore, was inclined to use
marijuana at the time of the alleged robbery.

Meek personally

observed Irvin use methamphetamine at least two years prior to
Ellis' trial.

R.137[3].

While Irvin denied marijuana use, he

did admit during cross-examination that he possessed marijuana
paraphernalia in 1990. R.134[25-26].

In light of the foregoing,

Meck's statement would go to Irvin's inclination to use drugs in
general, including methamphetamine, and the likelihood that he
sought marijuana on this occasion.
In addition to confirming Irvin's use of drugs, Meck's
statements would further establish that Irvin was inclined to
purchase drugs and, therefore, was a party to the drug deal with
Carter as Ellis asserts.

Irvin claimed that he did not strike a

deal with Carter since it is not his "usual practice" to buy
drugs from strangers.

R.134[25].

Meek, however, indicated that

Irvin owed money to one of Meck's friends for past drug deals.
R.137[3].

Further investigation of Meck's statement would reveal
9

the identity of Irvin's alleged supplier and whether he was a
friend or a stranger to Irvin prior to their drug dealing
relationship.

Such information would also establish the

likelihood that Irvin would seek drugs from unknown sources.

In

turn, this information would bolster Ellis' defense theory that
Irvin was inclined to buy drugs from anyone in the business of
selling them, including Carter, and, in fact, struck a deal which
went bad and eventually led to the robbery allegations.

Instead,

Ellis could show that Irvin may, in fact, solicit drugs from
anyone in the business of selling them, including Carter.
Without benefit of the continuance however, the trial court
prevented Ellis from obtaining and presenting material evidence
establishing Irvin's history of drug use and his purchasing
habit.
The materiality of Meck's statements in this instance is
bolstered by the fact that the existence of a drug deal itself is
a contested, "'vital point'11 and there is no other
11

'disinterested testimony'" regarding the matter.

State v.

Duncan, 132 P.2d 121, 125 (Utah 1942) (quoting Jensen v. Logan
City, 57 P.2d 708, 723 (Utah 1936)).

In the analogous context of

a request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence1,
1

Whether a new trial is warranted based on newly
discovered evidence depends upon criteria that are similar to
those considered in determining the necessity of a continuance.
A new trial is merited where: (1) the new evidence could not have
been discovered through reasonable diligence; (2) it is not
merely cumulative; and (3) it would render a different trial
outcome. See State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991).
Given the similarity between the analyses, a discussion of case
law concerning requests for a new trial is instructive to the
10

several Utah cases note that a new trial is appropriate where the
"newly discovered evidence [] clarif[ies] a fact that was
contested and resolved against the movant."
P. 2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990) 2 .

State v. Becker, 803

The Utah Supreme Court

explained that justice and the pursuit of truth requires the
court to grant a new trial where new evidence is material and the
evidence going to a contested issue is otherwise lacking.
Where disinterested testimony on the vital point in a case
is very scant, . . . and it appears that [newly discovered
testimony on that point] would change the result, a new
trial should be granted. While the granting or refusing of
the motion lies in the sound discretion of the court, where
there is a grave suspicion that justice may have miscarried
because of the lack of enlightenment on a vital point which
new evidence will apparently supply, and the other elements
attendant on obtaining a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence are present, it would be an abuse of
sound discretion not to grant the same.
Jensen, 57 P.2d at 723.
The fact that Meck's statements incidentally serve to
impeach Irvin does not detract from their materiality or the need
for a continuance in this case.

See State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d

750, 753 (Utah 1982)(continuance not warranted where new evidence
is for impeachment alone); see also Becker, 803 P.2d at 1294 (new
present issue.
2

See also James, 819 P.2d at 794 (new trial required where
newly discovered testimony, indicating that key prosecution
witness perjured himself, established independent evidence in
support of defendant's theory that witness committed perjury to
subvert trial to gain more lenient treatment in his own trial to
follow); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 198-99 (Utah 1987) (new
trial appropriate where new evidence suggested that victims, who
alleged that defendant forced them to stroke his penis until he
ejaculated, actually observed their mother having intercourse
with her boyfriend; new evidence would explain testimony of
victims and corroborate defendant's defense theory).
11

trial not warranted where new evidence only has impeachment
value).

In State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991), the Utah

Supreme Court held that although newly discovered evidence went
to the credibility of a key opposing witness, a new trial was
nonetheless required since the new evidence was independent,
corroborated the defendant's defense theory, and "concerned a
disputed fact that arose between [the key witness] and [the
defendant.]"

Id. at 794.

In that case, the defendant was

convicted based primarily on the testimony of the key witness, a
fellow inmate, who testified that he overheard defendant confess
the murder of the victim to another.

Id. at 787.

The key

witness offered the testimony in exchange for more lenient
treatment in his own trial.

Id. at 794.

After the close of

trial, yet another inmate informed the defendant that the key
witness perjured himself and lied about defendant's confession.
Id.

The Supreme Court held that this new information warranted a

new trial.

The Court reasoned that the "[e]vidence from a

neutral third party is not merely cumulative. . . . It is of a
different kind and nature than defendant's statements, and it
certainly could have a different quality in the eyes of the
jurors who assess the credibility of the witnesses."

Id.

Meck's statements are similar to the newly discovered
evidence at issue in James in that they add more than impeachment
value to the truth-finding process of Ellis' trial.

Id.; see

also Duncan, 132 P.2d at 125 ("purpose of trial is to obtain the
facts" and prevent "miscarriage of justice").
12

First, Meek is a

"neutral third party" with no interest in the outcome of Ellis'
trial.

The record does not indicate that Meek was offered

lenient treatment for his testimony.

See James, 819 P.2d at 794

(key witness' had interest in perjuring himself at defendant's
trial since he was offered more lenient treatment in exchange for
incriminating testimony).

Moreover, Meek and Ellis did not know

one another, hence it cannot be said that Meek sought to help out
a friend by providing false information.

Meek also did not know

Irvin well enough to harbor any animosity toward him and lie to
hurt him.

In fact, Meek had not seen Irvin in two years and was

only a casual acquaintance of Irvin from high school. R.137[23].

Hence, Meek was a disinterested source of material

information.
In addition to their neutrality, Meck's statements
substantiate Ellis' defense theory, namely the existence of a
drug deal between Irvin and Carter.

The evidence going to the

critical issue of the drug deal consists solely of Irvin's word
against that of Carter and Ellis. By definition, therefore, the
evidence before the jury was not objective.

Indeed, the

likelihood that Irvin's testimony was biased is even greater
considering the uncomfortable position he would be in if he
admitted to the police and, later, the court that he was involved
in a drug deal.

Meck's statements, by contrast, provide unbiased

evidence of the drug deal.

Hence, the fact that they tend to

impeach Irvin as well does not detract from their materiality and
the subsequent need for a continuance in this case.
13

With regard to requests for continuances in light of newly
discovered information, this Court has twice held that a
continuance is not merited where the information sought is
duplicative or available through alternative witnesses or
documents.

In Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295

(Utah App. 1994), the defendant sought a continuance in order to
access documents prepared by the opposing party that summarized
information already possessed by the defendant.

Id. at 299.

The

Court denied the continuance given that the information sought
was duplicative and, therefore, the defendant would not be
disadvantaged by the denial of the continuance.

Id.

The Court similarly held in State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708
(Utah App. 1993), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993), that
the defendant was not entitled to a continuance since the
testimony of the hoped-for witness, unavailable to testify due to
surgery, was otherwise available through her sworn deposition.
Id. at 715.

Since the information was available to the defendant

in an alternate form, the deposition, the Court found that the
defendant "was not prevented from obtaining or presenting
evidence."

Id.

Unlike the information at issue in Holbrook and Horton, the
information available through Meek is not duplicative or
available to Ellis through alternative witnesses or documents.
Meck's statements were not included in a sworn affidavit.
Moreover, no other witness or document approximated the
information Meek could provide.

Rather, the testimonies of Meek
14

and the supplier are the only independent evidence establishing
Irvin's drug habits.

Ellis could not demonstrate his defense

that the money exchanged hands through a drug deal through any
other evidence presented at trial or through examination of
witnesses since no one observed the altercation.

Given that the

information provided through Meek and the supplier is not
duplicative and cannot otherwise be substituted, Ellis was
"prevented from obtaining or presenting evidence" that was
material to his defense.

Horton, 848 P.2d at 715.

The Utah Supreme Court has also held that a continuance is
not necessary if the content of the anticipated testimony is so
"speculative" that a trial court could not "pass upon [its]
materiality."

Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752.

In Creviston, the

defendant's motion and supporting affidavit in support of the
continuance did not describe the content of the anticipated
testimony.

Id.

The absent witness, a codefendant who was

scheduled to be tried separately at a later date, asserted her
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to
divulge any information to the defendant until after her trial.
Id.

Consequently, the defendant admitted to the court that he

"had no way of knowing how [his codefendant] would testify" and
instead merely opined that her testimony would be "'vital711 and
"'in his behalf.'"

Id.

The Supreme Court held that such a

paucity of information did not provide a sufficient basis to
determine the materiality of the hoped-for testimony.

Id.; see

also State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985) (no abuse
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of discretion where trial court denied continuance based on
speculative information where the defendant "had no idea" what
absent witness would testify to).
Unlike the defendant in Creviston, the content of the
anticipated testimony of Meek is known and the trial court was
able to assess its materiality.

Meek himself indicated to both

Ellis and Ellis' attorney that he knew Irvin and that he saw
Irvin use methamphetamine.

R.137[2-4].

Ellis' attorney relayed

Meck's information to the trial court and explained its
significance to Ellis' defense.

Id.

Hence, the trial court had

ample information to "pass upon [its] materiality."

Creviston,

646 P.2d at 752.
Ellis likewise made an adequate showing regarding the
anticipated testimony of Irvin's supplier such that the trial
court was able to assess its materiality.

Id.

In the absence of

a continuance, Ellis did not have an opportunity to speak with
the supplier personally and clarify the details of his or her
anticipated testimony.

Nonetheless, the anticipated testimony

was narrowly characterized to the court: Meck's statement
indicated, and Ellis' attorney explained, that the supplier would
only testify regarding Irvin's drug purchases from him.
137 [3] .3

R.

Unlike the motion and affidavit in Creviston, where

3

This information would also give the added benefit of
corroborating Meck's statements to the extent that it would
verify his claims regarding Irvin. See, e.g., State v. Doyle,
918 P.2d 141, 144 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963
(Utah 1996)(upholding validity of search warrant premised on
information provided by citizen informant where informant's
statements were corroborated by independent observations of
16

the anticipated information was broadly defined as "'vital,'" and
could have, in fact touched upon any aspect of the defense, Ellis
tied the scope of the supplier's anticipated statements to a
certain subject matter.

Such a narrow characterization of the

testimony provided an adequate basis upon which the trial court
could assess its materiality.

Accordingly, Ellis' showing of

materiality with regard to Meck's possible testimony is not so
speculative that a continuance is not warranted in this case.
Id.
Based on the foregoing, Ellis adequately established that,
absent the continuance, he would not be able to obtain material
information.

See, Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476.

As noted by defense

counsel at trial, the newly discovered information is material in
that it substantiates Ellis' defense and is the only
"disinterested" evidence going to an otherwise contested issue
where the evidence is "scant."
R. 137 [3].

Jensen, 57 P.2d at 723; see also

Moreover, the information that Ellis seeks is not

duplicative or available through alternative witnesses or
documents.

See Horton, 848 P.2d at 715; Holbrook, 883 P.2d at

299. Finally, Ellis' showing of materiality and admissibility is
not so speculative or duplicative that a continuance is not
warranted here.

See Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752.

The content of

the anticipated testimony of both Meek and the supplier is
sufficiently defined such that the trial court could "pass upon

police); State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990)
(same).
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[its] materiality."

Id.

Hence, denial of the continuance

disadvantaged Ellis and "prevented him from obtaining or
presenting [material] evidence."

Horton, 848 P.2d at 715; see

also Holbrook, 883 P.2d at 299.
B.

Ellis Established That Meek Could Be Produced Within A
Reasonable Time.

Ellis made an adequate showing that Meek could be produced
within a reasonable time and without undue delay of the trial.
Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476.

Meek was a fellow inmate of Ellis,

housed in the jail adjoining the court complex, and was,
therefore, "reasonably available" as required by Oliver, 82 0 P.2d
at 476; R. 137 [2] . Meck's accessibility is demonstrated by the
fact that Ellis' attorney, upon the trial court's last minute
request, was able to locate and speak with Meek personally and
then return to the court that same morning, before trial was to
resume, in order to argue Ellis' motion for a continuance.
R.137[2] .

Indeed, given the proximity and immediate

accessibility of Meek, the State and Ellis could have feasibly
ascertained all the information they needed to put Meek on the
stand the same day that Ellis requested the continuance.

Hence,

Meek could have been produced without undue delay of the
proceedings.

See, Creviston, 646 P.2d at 753 (noting that months

or years required to obtain hoped-for witness was unreasonable);
Horton, 848 P.2d at 715 (six-to-eight-week projected recovery
time of hoped-for witness was unreasonable).
The fact that the jury was about to go into deliberation
when Ellis moved for the continuance does not weigh against the
18

need for a continuance in this instance.

In Duncan, the jury had

already retired to deliberate when the defendant requested a new
trial.

132 P.2d at 125.

Given the importance of the newly

discovered evidence, the Court noted that the jury ought to be
recalled in the interests of justice.

Id.

The purpose of trial is to obtain the facts. If testimony
is available which would tend to show the innocence of a
defendant, the court and counsel for both sides should aid
in the presentation of such testimony to prevent a
miscarriage of justice. The jury should be aided in every
reasonable manner to obtain all of the competent material
and relevant facts essential to enable the jurors to
determine the guilty or innocence of the accused. The mere

fact the jury has retired
to deliberate
is unimportant if
becomes apparent the jurors did not receive all of the
essential
facts.

it

Id. (emphasis added).
Unlike the jury in Duncan, the jury in this case had not yet
gone into deliberation; both parties had merely rested and the
jury was instructed when Ellis moved for the continuance.

Hence,

the interruption to the proceeding assumes even less importance
than that involved in Duncan.

Since Meck's statements amounted

to independent, corroborative evidence of a contested vital point
(the existence of the drug deal), they were essential to the jury
in determining Ellis7 guilt or innocence.

See supra Point I.A.

Under the circumstances, therefore, the trial court had the right
to reopen the case in order that Ellis might be able to present
essential information to the jury.

Duncan, 132 P.2d at 125.

With regard to Irvin's supplier, Meek did not indicate the
supplier's identity or location during the brief interview with
Ellis' attorney.

R.137[2-4].

Hence, the supplier's availability
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was undeterminable.

However, this information was not relevant

to the availability analysis at that juncture in the proceeding.
Ellis requested the continuance precisely to investigate Meck's
statements and determine, among other things, the identity and
availability of the supplier; he could not have discovered such
information absent the continuance.

See, Creviston, 646 P.2d at

753 (continuance not merited where moving party did not exercise
due diligence in ascertaining availability).

The availability of

the supplier would have to be the subject of a later hearing
since the purpose of this continuance was to have time to
research Meck's claims and determine the supplier's identity and
location in the first place.

Consequently, the lack of

information regarding the availability of the supplier did not
negatively impact Ellis' showing of reasonable availability.
Based on the foregoing, Ellis adequately demonstrated Meck's
reasonable availability.

Meek was housed in a jail adjoining the

court complex and was therefore immediately accessible and
available to testify.

In addition, the availability of the

supplier, although unknown to Ellis, was not relevant to the
availability analysis at that point in the proceeding since it
was the purpose of the continuance to investigate Meck's
statements and determine the identity and the availability of the
supplier in the first place.

Given the importance of Meck's

statements to the truth-finding process, the trial court should
have exercised its authority to recall the jury and reopen this
case, even though the jury was already in its deliberations.
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C.

Ellis Established Due Diligence In Preparing For Trial.

As required under Oliver, Ellis demonstrated due diligence
in preparing for trial prior to requesting the continuance.
P.2d at 476.

820

In Williams, with regard to justifiable

continuances, the Supreme Court stated that the "accused must
timely inform his attorney about matters pertinent to his
defense."

712 P.2d at 222.

stolen check.

Id.

In that case, the defendant forged a

The Court charged the defendant with

knowledge of the absent witness since he received the blank check
from her and claimed that he thought it was legitimate prior to
uttering it.

Id.

The Court reasoned that, "[i]f, in fact, he

believed that the check was good, he should have disclosed to his
attorney the circumstances under which he received it."

Id.; see

also Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah App.
1992)(continuance not merited where original expert witness
declined to testify and request was "solely due to [the moving
party's] own failure to retain and designate a new expert witness
in a timely manner").
Unlike the defendant in Williams, Ellis was not charged with
knowledge of Meek since he could not and would not have known of
his existence.
alleged events.

First, Ellis did not know Irvin prior to these
R.134[209].

Consequently, Ellis would not know

Irvin's acquaintances, including Meek and the supplier.

Second,

even though Meck's statements served Ellis' defense theory, Ellis
could not have anticipated Meek since Meek was not even a remote
player in the events giving rise to this charge.
21

See, Williams,

712 P.2d at 222 (defendant should have known about witness who
was directly involved in the crime).

Hence, unlike the defendant

in Williams, Ellis, to the best of his knowledge, "timely
informed his attorney about matters pertinent to his own
defense."

Id.

The fact that Ellis and Meek were housed in the same jail
did not impute knowledge to Ellis for purposes of the "diligence"
analysis here.

In James, the defendant was housed in the same

jail block as the newly discovered witness.

819 P.2d at 794.

The key witness against the defendant, also an inmate, admitted
to the new witness that he fabricated his incriminating testimony
against the defendant.

Id.; see supra Point I.A.

The new

witness did not tell the defendant about the key witness' perjury
until after the trial was over.

Id.

The Court held that the new

witness was not "reasonably discoverable."

Id. at 793.

Although

the defendant could discover the new witness by interviewing all
of the people housed with the key witness for evidence of their
conversations with him, such a task would be "insurmountable"
given the number of inmates and the "difficulties inherent in
obtaining visitation and interview privileges at the . . .
prison."

Id. at 794.

As in James, Ellis could not be expected to interview all
his fellow inmates to discover if any one of them might have
information about Irvin.
extraordinary measures.
819 P.2d at 793-94.

"Due diligence" does not require such
Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476; see also James,

Moreover, even if it did, Ellis would be
22

exempted in this case since, unlike the key witness in James,
Irvin was not an inmate and was, therefore, unlikely to have
connections with anyone else in the jail.

Accordingly, the fact

that Meek and Ellis were housed in the same jail did not render
Meek "reasonably discoverable" for purposes of the diligence
analysis.

Id. at 793; see also Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476.

Ellis' diligence is further demonstrated by the fact that he
vigorously prepared his defense in the absence of Meck's
statements.

In Oliver, this Court affirmed a trial court's

ruling that a continuance was not warranted partially because the
defendant banked on an anticipated plea agreement, which he
rejected at the last minute, and did not prepare his defense
despite the trial court's admonition to prepare for trial anyway.
820 P.2d at 477.
Unlike the defendant in Oliver, Ellis did not exhibit such a
lack of diligence that a continuance is not warranted here.
Indeed, Ellis vigorously pursued his defense theory that Irvin
was party to the drug deal through studied and vigorous crossexamination of Irvin, the State's four other witnesses, and the
codefendant, Carter.

R. 134,135.

Ellis did not hinge even a

portion of his case upon the hoped-for testimony of Meek since he
did not know of Meck's existence at the time.

Instead, Ellis

pursued his defense theory predominantly through crossexamination of Irvin, Carter, and the officers.

That Ellis

prepared his defense to the best of his ability prior to
requesting the continuance is exemplified by the fact that he
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rested his case based on such evidence.

If Ellis was attempting

to buy time and delay trial by feigning lack of knowledge of
Meek, he would have made the request prior to the beginning of
trial, and certainly before the jury was empaneled, when the
judge would be more amenable to the idea.

Rather, Ellis

requested the continuance after both parties rested and the jury
was about to go into deliberation.4

Ellis' motion at this point

in the proceeding, therefore, evinces his legitimate desire to
incorporate newly discovered, material evidence into his defense.
In sum, Ellis diligently prepared for his trial prior to
requesting the continuance.

Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476.

Ellis did

not know Irvin and therefore could not have known about Meek or
the supplier.

Consequently, Ellis did not fail in his duty to

reveal to his attorney all information pertinent to his defense.
Id.

Moreover, Ellis did not otherwise display negligence in

preparing for trial, but rather proceeded with zeal to explain
his defense through cross-examination of all the witnesses known
to him at the time.

Accordingly, Ellis adequately demonstrated

due diligence meriting a continuance in this case.
II.

Id.

ELLIS WAS MATERIALLY PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S
DENIAL OF A CONTINUANCE; THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL WOULD
HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT HAD THE CONTINUANCE BEEN GRANTED.

In addition to the foregoing criteria, the Oliver Court
determined that the party challenging the denial of a continuance
4

As noted supra Point I.B., the fact that the jury was
about to go into deliberation does not mitigate the need for a
continuance in this case given the importance of Meck's
information to the fact-finding process. See Duncan, 132 P.2d at
125.
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based on newly discovered evidence must make one of two showings
of prejudice in order to prevail upon appeal: the moving party
must show either that "it was materially prejudiced by the
court's denial of the continuance or that the trial result would
have been different had the continuance been granted."
at 476 (emphasis added). 5

82 0 P.2d

Under either prejudice standard,

Ellis is entitled to a new trial.
5

Oliver appears to be the only case regarding review of a
trial court's denial of a motion to continue that incorporates a
prejudice analysis in addition to assessment of the three
elements set forth in Point I in this brief. See 820 P.2d at 476
(importing prejudice analysis from State v. Barker, 667 P.2d 108,
114 (Wash. App. 1983)). Later continuance cases from this Court
and the Utah Supreme Court have not employed this analysis. See
Holbrook, 883 P.2d at 298-99; Horton, 848 P.2d at 714-15; State
v. Cabutatan, 861 P.2d 408, 413-414 (Utah 1993) (limiting
discussion to three continuance factors, but discussing prejudice
only in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
resulting from the denial of the continuance). Accordingly,
Ellis addresses the prejudice resulting from the denial of the
continuance in the event that this Court determines that such an
analysis is appropriate here. Should the Court decide to forgo a
prejudice analysis, however, Ellis is entitled to reversal and
remand under the three factors discussed in Point I.
In the event that the Court does employ a prejudice analysis
here, it should be noted that the Oliver standard, "that the
trial result would have been different had the continuance been
granted," differs from its counterpart in the context of new
trials and newly discovered evidence. 820 P.2d at 476. With
regard to requests for a new trial, the reviewing court assesses
whether the new evidence would "render a different result
probable on the retrial of the case." James, 819 P.2d at 793
(citing State v. Gellatlv, 449 P.2d 993, 996 (Utah 1969)); see
also State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994) (same). The
Oliver standard, by contrast, does not specifically state that
the reviewing court looks for new evidence that would proJbaJbly
affect the outcome. Instead, Oliver merely states that the
moving party must show that the "result would have been
different." 820 P.2d at 476. Given the almost impossible burden
of establishing that a trial outcome would have been different,
and in light of its counterpart in the context of requests for
new trials and newly discovered evidence, it follows that the
Oliver standard also contemplates a review for probable
impact on
trial outcome.
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First, Ellis is entitled to a new trial because he was
materially prejudiced by the trial court's denial of a
continuance.

As discussed supra Point I.A-C, Ellis was prevented

from presenting evidence material to his defense that was not
otherwise available through cross-examination of any other
witness or through presentation of any other document.

Meck's

statements were the only independent evidence going to Irvin's
drug use and purchasing habit.

No other evidence proffered at

trial by either party duplicated or even approximated the
information that Meek could have provided.
In denying the continuance, therefore, the trial court
prevented Ellis from presenting his defense as effectively as he
could have had the continuance been granted.

While Ellis was

able to communicate his defense theory through cross-examination
of Irvin, Carter, and the arresting officers, his presentation
was limited to the extent that it was gleaned predominantly
through the testimony of the opposing party's witnesses.

Where

Ellis was confined to the State's witnesses in communicating his
defense theory, Ellis' was hampered by the reluctance and
adversity implicit in the cross-examined answers of the State's
witnesses, most notably Irvin, who admitted that he was being
sarcastic on the stand.

R. 134 [27] .

The reluctance and

adversity likely suggested to the jury that Ellis was
manipulating their testimony in order to escape responsibility.
Ellis' presentation of his defense was further hampered given
that the officers testified that they arrested Ellis and Carter
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as suspects in the theft.

R.134[53-72],135[79-89]. Officers are

authority figures in the community and, therefore the jury may
have given greater weight to the fact that Gray and Mitchell
arrested Ellis and Carter, thinking that, in their wisdom and
experience, the officers knew the men were guilty.

This may have

persuaded the jury to give even less credit to Ellis' defense.6
Ellis' case was also impacted by codefendant Carter's
damaging testimony.

Carter and Ellis were tried together but

represented by different attorneys.

Carter admitted during

cross-examination that the supplier he was leading Irvin to was
actually located several blocks away, arguably too far to walk.
R.135 [179-80] .

The implication of Carter's admission bolstered

the State's theory that, at minimum, Carter schemed to set up a
deal with Irvin only to cheat him out of his money, either by
robbing him at a remote locale or by causing Irvin to become so
frustrated that he would surrender the money.

Carter's

admission, in turn, implicated Ellis in the alleged scheme
insofar as Ellis was tagging along with Carter that day.
R.135 [149,209] .
A continuance would have allowed Ellis to present his own,
independent evidence substantiating his defense, untainted by the
deleterious effects of the sarcasm and adversity exuding from
Irvin's testimony and that of the State's witnesses during cross-

6

The trial court gave a jury instruction regarding the
credibility of witnesses in general, but did not warn against
giving undue weight to the testimony of officers in particular.
R. 48 (Jury Instruction No. 9 ) .
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examination.

Specifically, Ellis could have shown through Meck's

testimony that Irvin was inclined to use drugs and that he had a
history of buying drugs and therefore engaged in the drug deal on
this particular occasion.

This information would substantiate

his case and'lend it more legitimacy in the minds of the jurors.
Moreover, Ellis would have been able to rehabilitate his
defense after Carter's damaging admission which implicated Ellis
in the scheme to steal Irvin's money.

Ellis and Carter already

testified that Ellis did not know Irvin.

R.135 [149-50,209] .

Their testimony also established that they were friends who had
not seen each other in a long time, as opposed to partners-incrime who always hung out together looking for ways to cause
trouble.

R.135[149,208].

In addition, they established that

Carter excused himself from his conversation with Ellis to speak
with Irvin alone and that Ellis was not privy to the ensuing drug
deal between Carter and Irvin.

R.135[149,208-09].

In light of

this evidence, Meck's statements would dispel Carter's damaging
admission which implicated Ellis by reinforcing that the drug
deal was between Irvin

and Carter,

and that Ellis was not a

culpable party since he was not aware of the deal and was with
Carter coincidentally when the deal went sour and Irvin made his
allegations.

Absent the continuance however, Ellis was not able

to substantiate his defense with independent, corroborative
evidence.

Accordingly, Ellis was materially prejudiced by the

denial of the continuance such that a new trial is necessary in
this case.
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Ellis is also entitled to a new trial on the alternative
ground that his trial outcome was changed by the denial of the
continuance.

See Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476.

Specifically, the

evidence against Ellis did not overwhelmingly suggest his guilt.
Hence, the impact of the material prejudice discussed above
likely changed the outcome of his trial.

James, 819 P.2d at 795.

In James, the Supreme Court held that the defendant probably
would not have been convicted had the newly discovered evidence
been presented at trial since the new evidence indicated that
defendant did not kill the victim intentionally or knowingly as
required for a murder conviction, but perhaps recklessly or
negligently.

819 P.2d at 795.

The Court so held because the

other evidence against the defendant, although sufficient, was
neither "overwhelming or compelling" and, therefore, "susceptible
of differing interpretations."

Id.

The Court concluded that in

light of the new evidence, "the jury would have had a reasonable
doubt as to whether defendant had the requisite intent to commit
murder."

Id.

I

As in James, the new evidence that Meek could provide would
have changed the outcome of trial since the other evidence
against Ellis was inconclusive.

For example, there is no direct

evidence linking Ellis to the alleged crime other than Irvin's
testimony.

The evidence establishing the critical events that

transpired between Irvin, Carter and Ellis consists solely of
Irvin's word against the testimony of Ellis and Carter.

Where

the evidence against a defendant consists only of the defendant's
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word against that of a key opposing witness, the probability of a
different outcome in light of the new evidence is particularly
great.

See, e.g.. State v. Perez, 946 P.2d 724, 732-33 (Utah

App. 1997) (absent prosecutorial statement bolstering credibility
of informant witness, defendant's trial outcome would be
different since evidence of vital fact consisted of defendant's
word against that of informant witness and no other corroborative
evidence existed).
Moreover, the evidence strongly suggests, and Carter admits,
that Carter and Irvin alone were involved in the altercation
resulting in Irvin7s allegation, and that Ellis was only tagging
along but not privy to the deal.

R.135[149-50,208-09].

For

example, no contraband or other incriminating items were found on
Ellis' person.

Rather, the allegedly stolen money was found on

Carter, not Ellis.7

R.135 [87].

In light of the inconclusive evidence and the material
prejudice resulting from the denial of the continuance, it is
probable that the jury opted to convict Ellis in this case.

The

equivocal evidence against Ellis rendered it "susceptible to
differing interpretations," especially when considered in light
of the evidence suggesting Ellis' innocence.
795.

James, 819 P.2d at

Consequently, the likelihood that Meck's information would

have persuaded the jury to acquit Ellis is high since it would
7

Even Judge Henriod at sentencing, upon Ellis' motion to
reduce the second degree offense to a third degree offense,
acknowledged that the facts of this case do not overwhelmingly
point to his guilt when he stated, "[this case] doesn't smell
like a second degree felony." R. 138 [13] .
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G Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with
• Defendant's probation may be transferred to
under the Interstate Compact as approved
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
Q Complete
hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole.
. days in jail.
Complete
hours of community service restitution in lieu of.
Defendant is to commit no crimes.
. for a review of this sentence
Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on .
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